By Chukwuma Okoli & Ndu Nwokolo
Despite efforts of the Nigerian security agencies to decimate the insurgents, there remain some locations in the BAY States which together form the Northeast Belt of Insurgency, where the insurgents continue to be resilient. The Northeast Belt of Insurgency consists of about 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs) – 10 in Borno State (Bama, Baga, Biu, Chibok, Gwoza, Kukawa, Kaga, Marte, Mongonu, Ngala), 5 in Adamawa State (Madagali, Michika, Mubi North, Mubi South, Maiha) and 3 in Yobe State (Damaturu, Gujba, Geidam). Together these LGAs form a belt which runs round Nigeria’s borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger and cuts through Borno State’s borders with Yobe and Adamawa states. The difficult topography of most of the communities in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency makes access difficult for both the Nigerian military and humanitarian aid agencies. This has become an advantage for the insurgents who hibernate in those communities from where they launch attacks on the military and civilians. Data from the NextierViolent Conflict Database show that, this Belt of Insurgency recorded 109 deaths arising from 19 violent incidents perpetrated by the Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgents in the first half of 2024 alone.
Beyond the violence perpetrated by the insurgents, there is a growing number of refugees and asylum seekers in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency because irregular migrants take advantage of the breakdown in law and order to cross porous borders. There are at least over 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Adamawa axis of the Belt of Insurgency (Personal Communication, 2024). What factors enable and attract refugees into the Northeast Belt of Insurgency despite the violence unleashed by the insurgents? What are the implications of the refugee crisis for humanitarian response in the BAY States? This edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly examines the refugee crisis in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency.
- Refugees in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency: Enablers and Attractions
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence and is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country or to return there, for fear of persecution. This definition suggests two things about refugees: first, they have crossed international borders by fleeing a location(s) due to violence or persecution; second, they seek a relatively more peaceful location to settle. Therefore, it is expected that refugees will not be attracted to locations with ongoing violent conflict. But Northeast Nigeria presents a different scenario where persons from communities in neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroonflow into the Northeast region despite the violence unleashed by the insurgents. In Adamawa State, border communities like Madagali, Michika and Mubi are currently housing thousands of refugees from Cameroon. Many of these Cameroonian refugees are from communities like Mayo-moskoto, Mozogo, Mora, Kerawa, Koza and some others on Cameroon’s border with Nigeria, which have been variously attacked by Boko Haraminsurgent groups of Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP),(Personal Communication, 2024).
What enables the inflow of refugees into these conflict-affectedcommunities? The years of sustained Boko Haram attacks on state security across the Northeast Belt of Insurgency haveexacerbated the porosity of borders between Nigeria and its neighbours, thereby enabling refugees from the neighbouringcountries to move easily into these communities. The Boko Haram members are still living in mountainous and hard-to-reach areas of border communities like Gworza in Borno State and Madagali in Adamawa State, all in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency. Locations like Bakin Dutse, a community in Madagali, are still very dangerous because of the activities of Boko Haram (Personal Communication, 2024). From their hideouts in the forests and mountainous areas, the Boko Harammembers (especially JAS) attack the civilians in border communities. They kill the men and abduct the girls who they use as sex slaves and other domestic slaves (Personal Communication, 2024).
Again, most of the places where these Boko Haram members are staying are locations where the communities go for farming and to get things like firewood. So this makes it easy for Boko Haram to attack community members whenever they go in search of their daily living (Personal Communication, 2024).Between January 2024 and June 2024, together, the BAY Statesexperienced a total of 29 JAS/ISWAP attacks, resulting in the death of at least 130 persons, 27 injured, and eight kidnapped. Of these figures, communities in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency accounted for 109 (83.8%) of the total deaths and 7(87.5%) of total kidnap victims arising from JAS/ISWAP attacks in the Northeast within the same period (see Figure 1 & 2 from Nextier violent conflict data). The recent Boko Haram attack in Gwoza attests to the subsisting violence in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency. On Saturday, 29th June 2024, Boko Haram attacked Gwoza town, which lies on Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, killing at least 18 persons and injuring many in multiple suicide bombings. The massacre in Gwoza exemplifiesthe recurring violence in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency despite efforts by the state and community-based security agencies.
Communities in Niger, Chad and Cameroon, sharing borders with Nigeria’s Northeast, have also come under an onslaught of JAS/ISWAP, thereby throwing up multitudes of refugees flowing into the Northeast. In April 2023 alone, Boko Haram reportedly carried out 11 attacks on at least 14 villages in the Far North Cameroon. The sustained large-scale Boko Haram attacks on Cameroon’s northern border with Nigeria in 2023 reportedly left at least 3,000 people displaced along Nigerian border towns and villages, including Mayo-Moskota. Some of these displaced persons may have found their way into Northeast Nigeria as refugees.
What attracts refugees to the Northeast Belt of insurgency despite the subsisting violence? Two key factors explain the attraction of communities in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency for the refugees. First is the growing community resilience. Many of the communities in Nigeria’s border towns have resorted to self-help; they have formed community vigilantes and have bought guns to protect themselves. Communities in Mubi, Michika, and Madagali in Adamawa have resorted to remaining in their communities to engage Boko Haram groupsin gun battles. During such battles, some community members are killed, but they also succeed in killing some Boko Haram members (Personal Communication, 2024). Such resilience has brought some form of respite to the communities, therebymaking refugees feel safe in such communities.
The second factor attracting refugees from neighbouringcountries to the Northeast is the continuous flow of humanitarian aid into the region. Since the Boko Haram insurgency, there has been an increased flow of humanitarian aidinto the Northeast to ameliorate the suffering of communities affected by the insurgency. There are currently hundreds ofhumanitarian response agencies made up of government agencies, UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) across the BAY States that provide tons of relief materials and services in conflict-affected communities. This serves as an attraction for refugees from poor regions in the neighbouring countries sharing borders with Nigeria’s Northeast. For instance, the northern region of Cameroon, which shares borders with Nigeria along Adamawa State, is the poorest part of Cameroon and is also affected by the Boko Haraminsurgency. Hence, many refugees from the Northern part of Cameroon have flown into communities in Adamawa State.
- Implications of refugee crisis for humanitarian response in the BAY States
The principle of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The principle requires that a refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she faces serious threats to life or freedom. Generally, based on the 1951 Convention and related 1967 Protocol, the right of a refugee is elastic because the refugee becomes entitled to other rights the longer he/she remains in the host country. Therights of the refugee in the host country include the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting State, the right to basic amenities like housing and education, the right to public relief and assistance, the right to be issued identity and travel documents etc. Given the provisions of the 1951 Convention and other related conventions, the flow of refugees into the BAY States has implications for humanitarian response in the states. First, it places an obligation on governments at all levels to make provisions for the protection of the rights of refugees. Secondly, the refugees stretch the resources of the state and non-state humanitarian agencies. Thirdly, the increasing number of refugees makes planning for humanitarian response difficult given that the ease with which they cross borders predisposes the border communities at the BAY States to inflows of refugees whenever there are emergencies in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
- Recommendations: Dealing with the refugee crisis in the humanitarian context
- Enhance border management: the Nigerian government should collaborate with its neighbours under the auspices of regional bodies like the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to enhance border management through joint border patrol and surveillance.
- Deepen national capacity for identification and profiling of refugees: the Nigerian government, together with development partners, should enhance the technical capacity of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in the area of identification and profiling of refugees flowing into the Northeast. This will enable proper treatment of refugees in line with relevant international conventions and protocols.
- Support mechanisms for community resilience in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency: The government at all levels, in collaboration with development partners, should identify what makes communities in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency resilient. Mechanisms such as local informal businesses such as trading and the use of local vigilantes and hunters to combat insurgents should be strengthened.
- Support counter-insurgency operations of the Nigerian military and other state security agencies in the Northeast: The state security forces should be supported by ensuring a regular and adequate supply of required state-of-the-art ammunition. The morale of the personnel on the war front should also be boosted through improved welfare packages. This will enable the security agencies to cover more ground and decimate the insurgents still hibernating in hard-to-reach areas.
- Establish a Sub-regional Humanitarian Response Mechanism under the UNOCHA: Set up a subregionalhumanitarian response mechanism involving Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon to be coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This will ensure persons in need have fair access to humanitarian aid without crossing national borders.
- Policy Recommendations
- The Nigerian government should collaborate with its neighbours under the auspices of regional bodies to enhance border management through joint border patrol and surveillance.
- The Nigerian government, together with development partners, should enhance the technical capacity of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in the area of identification and profiling of refugees flowing into the Northeast.
- The government at all levels, in collaboration with development partners, should identify what makes communities in the Northeast Belt of Insurgency resilient.
- The state security forces should be supported by ensuring a regular and adequate supply of required state-of-the-art ammunition.
- There is a need to establish a sub-regional humanitarian response mechanism under the UNOCHA.
- Conclusion
Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government in degrading the JAS and ISWAP Boko Haram insurgent groups, the groups are still able to orchestrate violence in some communities lying across Nigeria’s borders with neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These border communities, which together form a belt of insurgency in the region, are also prone to the influx of refugees, which overstretch the limited resources of the humanitarian response agencies working hard to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis created by a combination of insurgency, climate change, poor governance, insecurity and food insecurity in the Northeast. Addressing the growing refugee crisis in the Northeast would reduce the burden on state and non-state actors in the humanitarian ecosystem.
(Dr. Chukwuma Okoli is an Associate Consultant at Nextier and a Lecturer at the Political Science Department at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. Dr Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner at Nextier and an Honorary Fellow at the School of Government at the University of Birmingham, UK. He is also a Visiting Research Fellow at the Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime, and Security at York University Canada)
