Opinion

The Hidden Tariff: Why insecurity is the missing variable in AfCFTA’s geoeconomics`

By Joshua Biem & Ndu Nwokolo

At the International Conference on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Geoeconomics of African States, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 9–10 November 2026, the addresses identified obstacles to continental integration in infrastructure, institutions, non-tariff barriers, and border procedures. The representative of Nigeria’s Vice-President put the point sharply: “A free trade area that is difficult to cross is free only on paper.” The observation is right, but it raises a question the conference left largely open: what makes the continent difficult to cross? Poor roads and slow customs are part of the answer. Increasingly, so is violence.

Insecurity functions as a hidden tariff on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It appears in no tariff schedule, yet it raises the cost, risk and unpredictability of moving goods. And unfortunately, it is always paid for. Unlike a customs duty, it is levied by whoever controls the road, whether insurgents, bandits, predatory checkpoints or the state’s own defensive measures, and it is paid in delays, stranded cargo, escorts, bribes, closures and lives. Intra-African trade was estimated at about US$213.8 billion in 2025, up 5.5 per cent, while intra-African exports were only about 17 per cent of the continent’s merchandise exports in 2024. No attempt is made here to estimate an ad valorem equivalent of this burden. This Nextier report argues that insecurity is the missing variable in AfCFTA’s geoeconomics: from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea and into Nigeria, armed and predatory actors tax trade through identifiable channels, and the continental market cannot deliver unless corridor security is treated as a core trade policy variable.

How the Hidden Tariff Works

The hidden tariff operates through four channels. The first is direct interdiction: the burning, seizure or blockade of cargo. The second is rent extraction: taxes, tolls, and protection payments imposed at checkpoints and along smuggling routes, which flow to armed actors rather than to any treasury. The third is risk-driven rerouting and suspension: transporters stop running, cargo piles up at ports and trade shifts to costlier routes. The fourth is policy-induced barriers: border closures, livelihood bans and escort-only movement adopted for security reasons that themselves restrict commerce. Each is a cost the tariff schedule does not capture, and each falls hardest on landlocked states and small traders who cannot absorb delay. The framework is this article’s own, offered as a lens rather than an established measure. These ‘hidden tariffs’ form part of the disruption of trade flows arguments, which, in turn, has a side effect named above.

The Sahel: When Corridors Become Targets

Landlocked Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger depend on coastal ports and road corridors for fuel, food and manufactures. Since September 2025, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has turned that dependence into a weapon, besieging supply routes that link Dakar, Abidjan and Conakry to Bamako. The trade effects were quickly measurable. Between September and November 2025, the Port of Dakar recorded about 120 containers a day blocked on Mali-bound routes, a monthly loss to Senegal estimated at 15 billion FCFA (roughly US$26.5 million). By late November, over 2,000 containers were stranded, and by February 2026 about 4,000 empty containers sat in Bamako because drivers feared the return journey. Senegalese exports to Mali, historically Senegal’s largest market, were reportedly about 15 per cent lower between November 2025 and May 2026 than a year earlier. The flows at stake are substantial: Mali imported US$1.67 billion of goods from Côte d’Ivoire and US$1.3 billion from Senegal in 2024.

The state response carries its own costs. Mali’s military escorted 940 supply trucks between Kayes and Bamako in a single week in late June 2026, diverting scarce force from fighting insurgents, and experts describe the blockade as economic warfare aimed at undermining the junta. None of this is entirely new. Research documented that taxation of goods and engagement with illicit economies are central to how JNIM finances and governs. Political fragmentation compounds the problem. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS on January 29, 2025. ECOWAS said it would continue to treat their goods under its Trade Liberalisation Scheme, but the three states imposed a 0.5 per cent import levy on ECOWAS goods, and Niger announced its withdrawalfrom the Multinational Joint Task Force. The first ministerial meeting of the ECOWAS–AES dialogue, held in Dakar on October 17, 2026, created joint working groups to prepare a framework cooperation agreement. That is welcome, but the building blocks of AfCFTA are being renegotiated while their corridors are under attack.

The Coastal States: Southward Creep

The insecurity is moving towards the ports. Attacks in northern Benin Republic rose from 22 in 2021 to 176 in 2024,and in April 2025 JNIM killed 54 Beninese soldiers in the W National Park complex, the deadliest attack on Benin’s forces to date. The International Crisis Group judges that Benin and Togo face the greatest peril and that the geographic spread allows JNIM to profit from cross-border trade. Togo has followed a similar trajectory, with JNIM attacks in the Savanes region since 2022, and in October 2025 JNIM claimed its first attack on Nigerian territory, near the Benin border. By January 2026, Togo and Benin had integrated coastal surveillance radars with sensor systems along their northern borders, an acknowledgement that the security of Lomé and Cotonou is tied to what happens hundreds of kilometres inland.

The Benin–Niger–Nigeria border triangle shows how security and trade collide. The Tsamiya–Kamba corridor in Kebbi State reopened on 9 February 2026 after seven years of closure, releasing over 1,600 Niger-bound trucks stranded for months. Nigerien imports account for around 80 per cent of transit volume at the Port of Cotonou. Yet attacks in the triangle rose by 86 per cent between 2024 and 2025, JNIM and Islamic State fighters use the W National Park as a sanctuary, and the Lakurawa group has spread from Sokoto and Kebbi into Benin and Niger. Resumed traffic, the Institute for Security Studies warns, offers armed groups new opportunities for loot, supplies and extortion rents, while Niger–Benin mistrust keeps the Gaya–Malanville crossing closed. The dilemma is stark. Closure was a security instrument, but it also operated as a prohibitive tariff. Reopening serves trade but widens the target. Geoeconomic strategy that ignores this trade-off is incomplete.

Nigeria and the Lake Chad: The Domestic Mirror

Nextier’s research shows the same logic at work around Lake Chad and inside Nigeria. In the Lake Chad Basin, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) embed themselves in communities by providing informal taxation, justice and resource management. Meanwhile, bans on fishing and pepper cultivation in Niger’s Diffa region, intended to choke insurgent financing, crippled local economies and pushed communities towards illicit networks. Security policy designed without trade logic can therefore raise the hidden tariff itself.

Inland, informal tolls are collected by many hands. Agents collecting revenue on behalf of sub-national governments, often politically connected, use violence against traders and transporters; the “ransom economy” has turned insecurity into a self-sustaining criminal industry; and in Osun State, contests over motor park control have reportedly been linked to political-criminal networks. The actors differ: insurgents in Diffa, bandits in Kebbi, thugs at motor parks. For a trader, however, the effect is the same, namely an unpredictable, unrecorded cost on every trip.

Fuel links these threads. Nigeria’s intra-African trade grew to US$9.02 billion in 2025, partly because refined petroleum exports to Cameroon, Ghana and Togo rose with Dangote Refinery’s output. Fuel is also the commodity that JNIM interdicts in Mali, and jihadist groups have reportedly profited from fuel-smuggling networks running from Nigeria through Benin towards the central Sahel, charging smugglers for protection and passage. The same product anchors AfCFTA-era trade gains and the war economy beyond Nigeria’s northern borders. Trade facilitation that ignores this overlap risks financing the actors it hopes to outcompete.

Where AfCFTA Policy Should Look Next

AfCFTA’s success depends on infrastructure, institutions and the removal of non-tariff barriers. That consensus is sound, but it leaves one variable largely in the background: the security of the corridors on which every other reform depends. Roads, ports and customs systems add little if goods cannot move safely along them.

The African Trade Group’s membership includes Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, all of which sit on the corridors and borderlands described above. This is an advantage. The WTO Chairs network already brings together researchers close to these trade routes and well placed to generate the evidence policymakers need. Future work could usefully examine how insecurity affects transport costs, transit times and informal payments, how border closures and livelihood bans change trading patterns, and which corridor-protection arrangements work in practice.

If AfCFTA is understood as a geoeconomic instrument for expanding production and regional value chains,³ then geoeconomics must also encompass the capacity to maintain open trade routes. Power in trade is partly the ability to move goods safely, and armed groups in the Sahel have shown that they understand this well.

Recommendations

i. AfCFTA Secretariat and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should add a corridor-security component to the AfCFTA implementation dashboard. Track incidents on corridors, convoy delays, informal payments and border closures, with defined escalation to the AfCFTA Secretariat and regional economic communities. Warnings without response change little.
ii. ECOWAS and AES (Alliance of Sahel States) working groups should agree on a corridor protocol. Safe passage for commercial convoys, no new trade barriers and shared incident reporting should sit alongside security cooperation, which is already one of ECOWAS’s four negotiating areas.
iii. Build a border-triangle compact. Nigeria, Benin, and Niger, together with Togo and Ghana, should share intelligence, jointly protect corridors, and pair any reopening of the Gaya–Malanville crossing with joint monitoring.
iv. National customs authorities and border management agencies (specifically involving Nigeria and Benin) should replace blunt closures with risk-based border management. Build on digital goods-in-transit systems such as the Nigeria–Benin SIGMAT launched in May 2025.
v. Make restrictions conflict-sensitive and end violent tolling. National governments should consult traders, including women and youth, before imposing livelihood bans, and criminalise violent third-party revenue collection while digitising payments.

AfCFTA’s promise will be decided less in negotiating halls than on the roads between Dakar and Bamako, Cotonou and Niamey, and Kebbi and Sokoto. Tariff schedules cut the visible tariff, security reduces the hidden one. Until both fall, the single market will remain a promise on paper. Africa’s geoeconomic ambition requires treating corridor security as a trade policy variable, not a background condition.

(Joshua Biem is a Senior Policy Research Analyst at Nextier; while Dr Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner at Nextier and a Reader (Associate Professor) at the Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria)


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