By Olive Aniunoh and Aya Watanabe
Religion has long been a powerful force in Nigeria, capable of forging unity or fuelling deep-seated division, hatred and violence. With over 90 per cent of the population identifying as either Christian or Muslim, the country is profoundly shaped by faith. Yet, this deeply religious landscape has become a double-edged sword. While it inspires solidarity and moral guidance, it also serves as a potent trigger for political manipulation, identity-based conflict, and extremist violence. The Nigerian State, often caught between upholding freedom of worship and maintaining secularism or secular governance, has struggled to assert a consistent, neutral stance amid the volatile interplay of faith and politics, sometimes failing to be neutral when necessary.
In moments of political transition, insecurity, or social upheaval, religious leaders and influencers, both offline and online, have increasingly shaped public opinion through sermons and rhetoric that sometimes inflame ethno-religious tensions. The consequences of unchecked narratives are already visible. From the rise of Boko Haram and Islamist insurgencies in the North to recurring Christian-Muslim clashes and divisive political mobilisation and discourse along sectarian lines, often due to religious disinformation and misinformation. Compounding this domestic challenge is the emerging threat of international religious interference, where foreign-backed narratives, often amplified through digital platforms, are seeping into national discourse, promoting ideological extremism, deepening divisions, and potentially triggering homegrown crises. These narratives, while appearing organic, are sometimes designed to destabilise or sway domestic politics in favour of external interests.
Despite these mounting threats, the State’s response has remained largely reactive, intervening only after narratives have entrenched division and violence. In this climate of rising extremism, politicised preaching, and growing mistrust, it is no longer tenable for the Nigerian government to sit on the sidelines. Considering this, this edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly argues for a bold, strategic approach to managing religious discourse. One that balances constitutional freedoms with the imperative of national security. It explores how proactive narrative control, regulation of inflammatory rhetoric, monitoring of foreign ideological infiltration, and the promotion of interfaith dialogue can safeguard Nigeria’s fragile unity and prevent religion from being weaponised from within and beyond its borders.
* Religion and the Nigerian State
The relationship between religion and the Nigerian State is one of complex entanglement between faith and statecraft, constitutionally defined yet practically blurred. Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) declares unequivocally that “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.” This is the cornerstone of Nigeria’s secular identity. It is meant to ensure neutrality and protect religious freedom in a country marked by deep religious diversity. However, in practice, this separation is largely symbolic. Twelve northern states have implemented Sharia penal codes, a move defended as culturally representative but criticised as a breach of secular principles. Political appointments frequently follow an unspoken religious quota system, reinforcing identity politics, while blasphemy-related violence, such as the 2022 lynching of Deborah Yakubu in Sokoto, demonstrates how extremism can undermine state authority. Political figures regularly seek endorsements from religious leaders, religious instruction is embedded in public education, government funds are used to sponsor pilgrimages, and state events are often infused with religious undertones. These contradictions have undermined Nigeria’s secular framework, making the State vulnerable to favouritism, bias, and religiously motivated mobilisation.
* The Impact of Religiously Motivated Mobilisation in Nigeria’s Conflict Theatre.
Nigeria stands at a dangerous crossroads, where religion, once a source of moral compass and community cohesion, is increasingly being weaponised to stoke division, legitimise violence, and accelerate the country’s descent into protracted conflict. Religiously motivated mobilisation has emerged as one of the most potent accelerants of violence in Nigeria’s already volatile conflict theatre. While the roots of Nigeria’s crises lie in a complex web of political, economic, and ethnocultural grievances, religion is now being strategically deployed as a tool for mobilisation and retaliation, particularly in times of insecurity. The recent gruesome lynching of sixteen individuals presumed to be Fulani herdsmen, an ethnic group widely associated with Islam, in Uromi, Edo State, has laid bare the perilous consequences of this trend.
Although the full details surrounding the Uromi killings in Edo State remain unverified, the incident has ignited a nationwide outcry, largely framed through a religious lens. Online discourse, particularly on social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and WhatsApp, rapidly morphed into religiously charged calls for vengeance. Messages calling for reprisal attacks against Christians and Southern Nigerians residing in the North have gained alarming traction, underscoring how easily unverified incidents can be exploited to inflame sectarian tensions. This is not an isolated incident but reflects a broader and increasingly dangerous pattern.
The framing of Fulani herdsmen as inherently “Muslim aggressors” has become a dominant narrative across Nigeria. This essentialist view reduces complex systemic land-use conflicts, such as those between farmers and pastoralists, into simplistic religious binaries. Killings of Fulani individuals are quickly cast as acts of “Christian resistance,” while any reprisal is painted as a “Muslim offensive.” This religious framing obscures the real drivers of conflict and replaces them with narratives of existential threat, mobilising entire communities for retribution. This dynamic has played out repeatedly in Nigeria’s history, from the Jos massacres and Zangon-Kataf riots to the Southern Kaduna and Benue violence, where local disputes were recast in Christian-Muslim terms, escalating tensions into full-scale bloodshed. In each case, religious mobilisation turned what might have been isolated clashes into self-perpetuating cycles of retaliatory violence with devastating consequences.
In the absence of credible, timely information from state authorities, Nigerians turn to social media, where the speed of virality outpaces fact-checking. Religious identity becomes the shorthand for blame and justification. Hate speech, misinformation, and incitement thrive in this vacuum, with clerics, influencers, and self-styled vigilante voices urging followers to take action. The social media ecosystem becomes a virtual battlefield where religious mobilisation is not just tolerated; it is encouraged and orchestrated. This digital amplification of religious narratives has real-world consequences. It hardens group identities, inflames communal fears, and legitimises pre-emptive or retaliatory violence. The weaponisation of religion on these platforms, if left unchecked, threatens to push Nigeria from sporadic communal strife into organised religious warfare and opens the country up to external manipulations along religious lines.
Beyond communal clashes, religiously motivated mobilisation creates fertile ground for extremist actors. In “The Resurgence of Militant Islamism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram”, Uzoechi C.P. posits that extremist sects like Boko Haram are in pursuit of a mission of instituting and enforcing strictly Islamic puritanism of the Sharia rule over a secular state Nigeria. Simultaneously, Christian militias in the Middle Belt portray themselves as protectors of their communities from “Muslim Fulani jihadists.” In both narratives, the State is cast as weak, biased, or complicit, further eroding its legitimacy and emboldening non-state actors. This failure of the State encourages the rise of vigilante groups and militias like the Eastern Security Network (ESN) or Yan Banga, who operate along ethno-religious lines. With every retaliatory attack, Nigeria’s authority structures weaken, replaced by dangerous alternative power centres built on fear, identity, and revenge.
* The Rising Foreign Narratives on Religion in Nigeria
Adding to these domestic complexities is the growing influence of international religious actors. Through online platforms, transnational networks, foreign-funded religious organisations, and external ideologies, some of which promote intolerance, are increasingly shaping narratives within Nigeria. The interplay between Nigeria’s internal religious tensions and growing international scrutiny has reached a critical juncture, with foreign opinions increasingly framing Nigeria’s conflicts through a religious lens. In a striking development, voices have intensified pressure on the Trump administration to designate Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) for religious freedom violations, citing alleged persecution of Christians. This push, spearheaded by elected officials and advocacy groups, reflects a selective narrative that oversimplifies Nigeria’s complex security crises into a binary “Muslim vs. Christian” war. While sectarian violence is undeniably a factor, the politicisation of Nigeria’s struggles by foreign actors risks distorting realities on the ground, exacerbating polarisation, and emboldening retaliatory extremism.
The recent Nigerian Supreme Court ruling upholding the death sentence of a farmer who killed a herder in “self-defence” has further inflamed these tensions. Critics argue that the judiciary’s harsh stance, contrasted with the perceived impunity for herders accused of violence, reinforces suspicions of systemic bias against predominantly Christian farming communities. This ruling, amplified by international media and religious freedom lobbies, feeds into the foreign portrayal of Nigeria as a hotspot for Christian persecution despite evidence that victims of violence cut across religious lines. The danger here is twofold: foreign intervention risks legitimising partisan narratives, while Nigeria’s government, wary of external pressure, may respond with reactive policies that prioritise optics over justice, further eroding public trust in the State’s neutrality.
Nigeria’s vulnerability to transnational religious influence extends beyond political pressure, as foreign-funded evangelical movements, Salafist networks, and diaspora activism frequently import extremist ideologies that contribute to the radicalisation of local actors. In the absence of a robust regulatory framework to monitor foreign religious funding and propaganda, Nigeria’s control over its conflict narratives diminishes. The failure to uphold constitutional secularism creates a power vacuum that external actors can exploit, transforming domestic grievances into proxy battlegrounds for global ideological conflicts.
While accountability for violence is necessary, the government must resist external actors who reduce Nigeria’s crises to religious persecution. Diplomatic engagements should emphasise the complex, multidimensional roots of conflict (land disputes, economic marginalisation, weak policing). The Supreme Court’s controversial ruling also highlights the need for transparent, context-sensitive justice. Legal reforms should ensure proportionality in sentencing and address perceived biases in handling context-sensitive cases. Additionally, to safeguard national cohesion, Nigeria must ensure that all religious programmes receiving funding within its borders adhere to principles of neutrality, promoting peaceful coexistence and refraining from rhetoric or actions that incite one religious group against another.
* Religious Misinformation and Disinformation: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Nigeria has suffered from misinformation and disinformation with religious motives. Issues such as Boko Haram, ethnoreligious violence and politically stirred narratives have made social cohesion fragile. In this context, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an appropriate practical point of comparison. The country experienced conflict from 1992 to 1995 and is still suffering from the misinformation, disinformation and ethnic conflict that resulted from that conflict. Although the historical and geopolitical contexts are different, the issues of identity, trust, and reconciliation are considered to be examples that are also applicable to Nigeria. The aim of the comparison is to show how the issues of misinformation and disinformation are dealt with in Bosnia and how these can be applied in Nigeria.
Misinformation about religion remains a powerful force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some political leaders continue to deny atrocities such as the Srebrenica massacre, which has been internationally recognised as genocide. Nationalist media sometimes portray Bosniak Muslims as religious extremists, repeating wartime propaganda. A 2019 report by Zašto ne found that disinformation is often politically motivated and that religious minorities are targeted, especially on social media. Young people born after the war are particularly vulnerable, having grown up in isolated communities and being exposed to biased education and media.
PRO-Future is one of the country’s most comprehensive peacebuilding efforts to address these ongoing challenges (‘Trust, Understanding, Responsibility for the Future’). Funded by USAID and implemented by Catholic Relief Services, PRO-Future began in 2014 and is active in more than 75 municipalities. It aims to rebuild trust between ethnic and religious communities through dialogue, civic cooperation, and youth engagement. The initial project phases, PRO-Future I and II, had set deadlines, but the programme has not ended. It continues through local partnerships and locally driven initiatives. As of 2023, activities include interfaith dialogue, the adoption of municipal platforms for peace, and peace education for youth (U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
According to an interim evaluation by MEASURE-BiH, PRO-Future is achieving tangible results. Participants report that inter-ethnic relations have improved, tolerance has increased, and hate speech has decreased. Young people involved in PRO-Future activities are more likely to support reconciliation and reject misinformation. Despite facing political resistance in some areas, the programme has become one of the most effective and sustainable peacebuilding initiatives in Bosnia.
One way to resolve ethnic tensions is to obtain and accept correct information. This project in BiH focuses on this. It focuses on how to determine what is correct information and how to accept it, especially among young people. This is probably one of the reasons why the project has been successful in BiH. Focusing on young people is something that could also be applied in Nigeria. On the other hand, it would be necessary to adapt the activities to the situation in Nigeria and decide which local actors would be involved. In the case of BiH, a Catholic organisation was carrying out the activities with support from USAID. If local organisations take the lead in carrying out activities, there is a possibility that the activities will go more smoothly in terms of being more closely linked to the local area. On the other hand, it would be necessary to carefully consider whether the activities should be carried out by religious organisations or by organisations that are not related to religion.
* Promoting and Protecting Freedom of Religion or Belief” (PP FoRB) programme in Nigeria.
Nigeria’s volatile religious landscape has attracted diverse interventions, ranging from locally grounded peacebuilding initiatives to externally driven advocacy campaigns. A distinct approach stands out: Search for Common Ground’s “Promoting and Protecting Freedom of Religion or Belief” (PP FoRB) programme, which emphasises mediation and social cohesion. An analysis of this programme reveals a positive intentionality in methodology, impact, and unintended consequences, highlighting why Nigeria must critically assess foreign interventions to avoid counterproductive outcomes.
Funded by the Netherlands and implemented by the NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG), the PP FoRB programme adopts a neutral, community-based approach to mitigate religious tensions. The PP FoRB programme’s interfaith dialogue platforms play a crucial role in bridging divides by convening Muslim and Christian leaders to jointly combat hate speech while emphasising shared values that unite communities. Complementing this approach, media literacy campaigns equip journalists and social media influencers with tools to report responsibly on religious matters, helping to prevent the spread of inflammatory content that often fuels violence. Central to the program’s methodology is its commitment to local ownership. It sees international organisations like Search for Common Ground working in genuine partnership with Nigerian civil society rather than imposing foreign frameworks. This locally grounded strategy has yielded tangible results in conflict hotspots such as Plateau and Kaduna states, where interfaith councils have successfully mediated disputes before they erupt into full-scale violence.
While programmes like Search for Common Ground’s PP FoRB initiative exemplify locally grounded, neutrality-focused interventions, not all external engagements in Nigeria’s religious landscape maintain this careful balance. Several international and foreign-sponsored initiatives, often rooted in varying interpretations of religious freedom or human rights, have faced criticism for inadvertently deepening divides or provoking backlash. Advocacy campaigns sometimes frame religious tensions strictly through the lens of victimhood and oppression, neglecting the complex, multi-layered drivers of violence such as land disputes, governance failures, and historical grievances. This oversimplification can delegitimise the experiences of communities whose conflicts are more socio-political than purely religious, thereby reinforcing divisions rather than resolving them.
Externally imposed narratives can also undermine the legitimacy of Nigerian state institutions and local peace actors. When foreign governments or INGOs bypass state mechanisms and directly support specific religious leaders or institutions without a broader consultative framework, it risks creating perceptions of favouritism and external manipulation. In fragile environments like Nigeria’s Middle Belt, such perceptions can escalate sensitive inter-group relations, leading to mistrust of the State and “externally aligned” actors. In contrast, the PP FoRB programme’s insistence on collaboration with Nigerian civil society and its avoidance of top-down prescriptions helps maintain legitimacy among both Christian and Muslim stakeholders. Its success in Plateau and Kaduna, for example, lies in its emphasis on joint ownership, balanced narratives, and shared solutions rather than ideological alignment with external funders.
Perhaps most alarmingly, interventions perceived as biased or culturally tone-deaf can inadvertently provide fodder for extremist groups. Boko Haram, for example, has often framed its insurgency as a resistance to Western values and foreign interference, pointing to Christian advocacy by international actors as proof of an anti-Muslim agenda. While such narratives are self-serving, they resonate when foreign programmes fail to account for Nigeria’s religious and cultural complexity. Nigeria cannot afford foreign interventions that inflame its already volatile religious dynamics, no matter how well-intentioned. While international support is valuable, neutrality, local ownership, and context sensitivity must be non-negotiable principles. Programmes like PP FoRB offer a replicable model, not because they are perfect, but because they respect Nigeria’s pluralism and prioritise solutions built from within.
Recommendations:
• Institutionalise Narrative Monitoring Systems: The Nigerian government should establish an interagency task force to monitor and fact-check religious narratives online and offline, especially during periods of political transition or insecurity.
• Promote Interfaith Dialogue: There should be a nationwide expansion of interfaith platforms modelled after successful initiatives like the PP FoRB, ensuring grassroots participation and local ownership.
• Regulate Foreign Religious Funding: The Nigerian government must push for stronger legal mechanisms to track and vet foreign religious funding and media campaigns to ensure compliance with national unity and anti-extremism goals.
• Empower Youth with Media Literacy: The Federal and State Ministries of Education should integrate critical thinking and media literacy into educational curricula to curb the spread of misinformation and disinformation, inspired by Bosnia’s PRO-Future programme.
• Revise Legal Frameworks for Religious Neutrality: The Judiciary must embark on a judicial overview to entrench proportionality and fairness in the application of justice in religiously sensitive cases to avoid perceptions of bias or institutional complicity.
Conclusion:
Religious mobilisation can function as a catalyst for violence in Nigeria and a significant factor in accelerating political instability and social division. It has led to the justification of violence and a cycle of retaliation. Religious ideologies and financial support flowing in from outside the country are further complicating the tensions within the country. These dynamics have reached a stage where a passive response from the State can no longer suppress them. Therefore, to ensure religious freedom in Nigeria while preventing its misuse, it is necessary to establish a framework in which the state and local communities work together to strategically shape and manage religious narratives. Alongside state-level responses such as reviewing the legal system, making foreign funding more transparent, regulating the media, promoting dialogue between local communities, media literacy education, youth engagement and a ‘localised approach’ that supports ‘local communities’ initiatives in constructing and deconstructing narratives is essential. As the PRO-Future programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows, local initiatives to promote peace education and interfaith dialogue among young people effectively strengthen resistance to misinformation and foster a sense of coexistence. To realise a future where religion is not a source of division but a foundation for peace, there must be a political will to rebuild the power of narrative in the region and the nation.
(Authored by Olive Aniunoh, a Legal, Policy and Research Analyst at Nextier, and a graduate of law from the University of Birmingham, England; and Aya Watanabe, a postgraduate student at SOAS, University of London, and Hosei University in Tokyo)
