By Chibuike Njoku & Ndu Nwokolo
Security has traditionally been conceived as the core responsibility of the state, rooted in sovereign authority, hierarchical control, and the imperative of regime survival. In Nigeria, this state-centric approach has long shaped the country’s security architecture, with institutions such as the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Nigeria Police Force leading responses to insurgency, militancy, and cross-border threats. This approach is most evident in military-led operations against violent extremism in the North East and in managing separatist agitations across other regions.
However, Nigeria’s contemporary security environment increasingly challenges this traditional framework. Threats are no longer confined to territorial boundaries or conventional warfare; they are diffuse, transnational, and deeply embedded within society. The rise of terrorism, banditry, farmer–herder conflicts, kidnapping, communal violence, secessionist movements, and organised crime has blurred the lines between internal and external security, as well as between civilian and combatant spaces. Between January and December 2025, the Nextier Nigeria Violent Conflicts Database recorded 4,654 fatalities and 3,141 kidnapping victims across 1,274 incidents nationwide, underscoring both the scale and persistence of insecurity and the limits of a purely militarised response.
As threats evolve, so does the meaning of security. Issues outside national defense, such as communal tensions, religious mobilisation, and digital misinformation, are increasingly framed as security concerns. This reflects what Security Studies describes as securitisation, where diverse societal challenges are elevated to urgent security matters. In Nigeria, this shift is driving a transition toward a societal security paradigm focused on protecting communities and social cohesion. Within this framework, citizens are no longer passive recipients of protection but active participants, serving as informants and vigilantes in an expanding security landscape. This research report of the Nextier SPD Policy examines the transition from state-centric to societal security in Nigeria, interrogating how the expansion of securitisation is reshaping citizens’ roles, the risks and trade-offs it generates for democratic governance, and the policy measures required to balance effective security provision with the protection of civil liberties.
- Expansion of Securitization in Nigeria
Nigeria has experienced a significant expansion in what is defined and governed as “security,” extending beyond traditional military threats to encompass a wide range of societal issues. While this shift reflects the complexity of contemporary risks, it also signals a growing tendency to frame social, political, and technological challenges as existential threats requiring urgent state intervention. A key dimension of this trend is the securitisation of ethnic tensions. Longstanding conflicts such as the farmer–herder violence across the Middle Belt, particularly in Benue and Plateau States, are increasingly framed as threats to national stability rather than as governance, land-use, or climate-related challenges.
Religious movements have also become central to Nigeria’s securitisation landscape. For instance, the violent clashes involving the Islamic Movement and state authorities have been framed as security concerns. While some of these cases involve genuine risks, the broad application of security logic has led to increased surveillance of religious groups and, at times, restrictive measures that blur the boundary between maintaining public order and limiting religious freedoms.
In addition, social media and digital spaces are increasingly securitised. The role of online platforms in amplifying misinformation during events such as the End SARS protestshas reinforced state perceptions of digital communication as a threat to stability. Consequently, regulatory responses have prioritised control through monitoring, content restrictions, and proposed legislation, raising concerns about censorship and shrinking civic space.
State responses to these perceived threats reveal an expanded security logic. Surveillance – both digital and physical has intensified, often without robust oversight. Emergency rhetoric is frequently deployed to justify extraordinary measures, framing diverse issues as urgent national threats and narrowing the space for dissent. At the same time, legal restrictions targeting hate speech, cyber activities, and public assembly remain broadly defined, enabling selective enforcement against activists, journalists, and opposition voices.
While securitisation can enhance rapid response to emerging threats, it also reconfigures state power in ways that risk overreach. The prioritisation of coercive approaches often sidelines structural solutions, while the normalisation of security practices in everyday life raises concerns about accountability, civil liberties, and democratic governance.
- Rise of the Security Citizen
A defining feature of Nigeria’s shift toward societal security is the emergence of the “security citizen” – a model in which individuals are increasingly expected to participate directly in providing security. Citizens are now actively mobilised as informants, forming the backbone of local intelligence networks. Across conflict-affected regions such as the Northeast and Northwest, communities routinely provide information to security agencies on suspicious movements, armed groups, and criminal activities. While this enhances situational awareness, it also exposes civilians to retaliation and raises concerns about the absence of formal protection mechanisms.
The rise of vigilante and community defense groups further illustrates this shift. Groups such as the Civilian Joint Task Force in the Northeast and the Amotekun vigilante groups in the Southwest have emerged as critical actors in local security governance. These groups often fill operational gaps left by overstretched state forces, contributing to intelligence gathering, patrol, and, in some cases, direct combat support. However, their growing influence also presents challenges, including weak accountability, uneven training, and the risk of human rights abuses or politicisation.
At the same time, citizens are increasingly functioning as digital watchdogs. Social media platforms have become spaces where individuals monitor, report, and sometimes amplify security-related information, from documenting incidents of violence to exposing perceived threats. While this can support transparency and early warning, it also contributes to the rapid spread of misinformation, panic, and unverified claims, particularly during crises.
Efforts to formalise citizen participation are evident in community policing initiatives led by the Nigeria Police Force, which aim to build trust and collaboration between law enforcement and local communities. Yet, in practice, the boundary between formal and informal security roles remains blurred, with informal actors often operating without clear legal frameworks. Overall, the rise of the security citizen reflects an adaptive response to insecurity but also signals a profound transformation in state–society relations, raising critical questions about responsibility, accountability, and the limits of citizen-led security.
- Risks and Trade-offs
While the expansion of social security and the rise of citizen participation reflect adaptive responses to Nigeria’s complex threat environment, they also entail significant risks and trade-offs with far-reaching implications for governance and democratic stability.
A primary concern relates to human rights violations. The growing involvement of both state and non-state actors in security provision, often without adequate oversight, has increased the likelihood of abuses, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial actions, and excessive use of force. Closely linked to this is the risk of state abdication of responsibility. As citizens are increasingly mobilised as informants, vigilantes, and digital monitors, there is a danger that the state may gradually shift its core security obligations onto communities. Another critical issue is the elite manipulation of security narratives. Political and security elites may strategically frame certain social or political issues as security threats to justify expanded powers or suppress dissent. For example, protests, activism, or opposition movements can be portrayed as destabilising forces, enabling the use of coercive measures under the guise of national security.
Taken together, these dynamics highlight a central dilemma: while securitisation may enhance short-term responsiveness to threats, its unchecked expansion risks weakening institutional accountability, eroding civil liberties, and deepening social fragmentation.
- Governance and Accountability Gaps
The expansion of societal security in Nigeria has outpaced the development of robust governance and accountability mechanisms, creating significant institutional gaps. As security provision increasingly involves a mix of state and non-state actors, the absence of clear regulatory frameworks and oversight structures raises concerns about legitimacy, coordination, and the rule of law.
A central challenge is the lack of oversight over non-state security actors. Groups such as the Civilian Joint Task Force and the Amotekun vigilante groups have become deeply embedded in local security architectures, often playing frontline roles in intelligence gathering and enforcement. However, many of these actors operate with limited supervision, unclear chains of command, and uneven training standards. Closely related is the lack of comprehensive legal frameworks governing their operations. While some state-level initiatives have attempted to formalise community-based security outfits, national coherence remains weak.
The politicisation of security narratives further deepens these governance challenges. Security threats are sometimes framed in ways that align with political interests, shaping both public perception and policy responses. In highly contested environments, this can lead to the selective labeling of groups or activities as “security threats,” thereby justifying coercive measures while shielding others from scrutiny. Such practices erode public trust, weaken institutional credibility, and risk transforming security governance into an instrument of political control rather than a neutral public good.
- Recommendations
Addressing the risks associated with the expansion of securitisation in Nigeria requires coordinated, multi-level interventions that balance security effectiveness with democratic accountability. Key actors organise the following recommendations:
i. Federal Government: The federal government should take the lead in establishing a coherent national societal security framework that clearly defines the scope, objectives, and limits of security practices beyond traditional military concerns. In addition, there is a need to strengthen oversight of security agencies, including parliamentary and judicial mechanisms, to ensure transparency, accountability, and compliance with human rights standards.
ii. Security Agencies: Security agencies should move toward institutionalising community policing as a core strategy, but with well-defined safeguards to prevent abuse. This includes establishing formal channels for citizen engagement, clarifying roles, and ensuring accountability for both officers and community actors.
iii. State Governments: State governments should regulate vigilante and community defense groups, ensuring theyoperate within clearly defined legal and operational frameworks. This includes registration, training, and monitoring systems. Additionally, states should invest in local conflict-prevention and resolution mechanisms, particularly in high-risk areas such as the Middle Belt, by addressing the underlying drivers of violence, includingland disputes, resource competition, and identity tensions.
iv. Civil Society Organisations: Civil society actors should strengthen their monitoring and documentation of securitisation-related abuses and hold both state and non-state actors accountable. They should also expand civic education efforts to help citizens understand their rights and responsibilities in an evolving security landscape. This includes raising awareness about the risks of misinformation, profiling, and unlawful participation in security activities.
v. Media and Technology Platforms: Media organisationsand tech platforms must play a balanced role by countering disinformation without securitising dissent. This requires strengthening fact-checking mechanisms, promoting ethical journalism, and avoiding sensationalist narratives that frame all dissent as a security threat. At the same time, platforms should encourage responsible digital engagement, ensuring that efforts to curb harmful content do not undermine freedom of expression or democratic debate.
Nigeria’s transition from a state-centric to a societal security paradigm is both real and increasingly irreversible. The complexity of contemporary threats, ranging from violent conflict to digital disinformation, has necessitated broader approaches that go beyond traditional military responses. However, while this shift reflects adaptive governance, it also introduces significant risks that must be carefully managed. Without clear boundaries, securitisation can erode civil liberties, weaken democratic institutions, and blur accountability between state and non-state actors. Managing this transition requires a deliberate balance: strengthening security responses while safeguarding rights, ensuring oversight, and maintaining public trust. The challenge is not to reverse the shift, but to govern it responsibly through coherent frameworks, inclusive policies, and accountable institutions. Nigeria’s security future depends not only on stronger states but on empowered citizens whose roles must be clearly defined, protected, and democratically governed.
(Dr. Chibuike Njoku is an Associate Consultant at Nextier, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Ile-Ife; while Dr. Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner at Nextier and a Reader – Associate Professor – at the Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria)
