By Chukwuma Okoli & Ndu Nwokolo
The April 25-26 terrorist attacks in Mali by a coalition of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) – a Tuareg pro-independence armed movement – signpost the significance of projections of the Nextier’s 2026 Security and Conflict Outlook, which highlights the implications of alliance formation by terror groups, bandits, insurgents and other Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) operating across the Sahel. Although earlier studies suggest a limited possibility of alliance between Jihadist terror organisations and NSAGs involved in banditry (Barnett, Rufa’I, & Abdulaziz, 2022), recent events have shown increasing convergence between Jihadist terrorists and other NSAGs across the Sahel. In Nigeria, JNIM has successfully established an alliance with local bandits, enabling its footprint and expansion in the country. The alliance between JNIM and FLA in Mali is plausible because both groups have ambitious political objectives: the JNIM aims to establish an Islamic State, while the FLA pursues the independence of Azawad, the northern region of Mali. The April 25-26, 2026, high-impact attacks by a coalition of JNIM and FLA are not an isolated case relating to Mali alone; it is a manifestation of the increasing successes achieved by terror and violent extremist groups across the Sahel region, particularly in Central Sahel, through their new strategy of alliance formation and coordinated attacks.
The alliance by Sahel-based NSAGs stands side by side with the security alliance formed by state actors such as the Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), a security alliance established by three countries in the Central Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – in 2023. However, while the terror and violent extremist groups have achieved more through their alliance formation in the Sahel, the state-based alliance – the AES – has shown continuous signs of faltering. What is more, the formation of the AES weakened the capacity of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to facilitate regional security cooperation necessary for combating Jihadist insurgency in the Sahel. Based on analysis of data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED), at least 3291 fatalities were recorded in 561 incidents of attacks on civilians alone in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger between January 2025 and April 2026. Aside from a large number of fatalities resulting from their coordinated attacks, the allied terror groups have gained control of more territories across the Sahel, particularly in the Central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This Nextier SPD Policy article explains why allied terror groups may inflict more harm on AES member states and the entire Sahel in the absence of any comprehensive regional security architecture in the Sahel.
Alliance of NSAGs Versus Alliance of Sahel States
The Central Sahel is torn apart by two warring, mutually exclusive alliances. On the one hand, there is an increasing alliance among NSAGs in which Jihadist terror groups establish alliances with local armed bandits, separatist groups and criminal networks for mutually beneficial purposes. Conversely, the AES emerged as a defense pact by three states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, after their relapse to military rule and exit from the Economic Community of West African States in 2025. The AES was established for collective defense and regime protection of member states. As part of efforts to combat terrorism across member states, the AES established a 5,000-troop anti-jihadist force in April 2025. Yet, the group has failed to achieve its objective, particularly in terms of protecting the states from the ravages of insurgents and terror groups operating across the Central Sahel. Terror groups have continued to inflict harm, not just on AES member states, but across the Sahel. Between January and December 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported 9362 deaths arising from 3737 security incidents across the AES member states. Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED) showed that between January 2025 and April 2026, 3291 fatalities were recorded in 561 incidents of attacks on civilians alone in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (see table 1).
Aside from the increase in fatalities arising from terror attacks, terror groups have continued to gain more ground with their capture of more territories hitherto under the control of governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Following the April 25-26 attacks, the allied terror groups captured the city of Kidal in northern Mali, leading to withdrawal of Russian mercenaries providing protection for the government. The capture of the city of Kidal is a significant feat for the allied terror groups because of the symbolic, economic, and geostrategic significance of the city. Its location close to both Algeria and Niger would facilitate cross-border activities by the terror groups. The capture of Kidal would also enhance the revenue sources of the terror groups due to the bourgeoning illicit trafficking in the city. Besides, the military equipment left behind in the city by the fleeing Russian mercenaries would further bolster the armory of the allied terror groups. Terror groups are also winning the battle in Burkina Faso, where terrorists operate in at least 80% of the country and are estimated to kill at least 2,000 civilians annually in recent years.
Why the Allied Terror Groups are Winning the Battle Against the Alliance for Sahel States
The rising number of fatalities from terror attacks and the increase in the number of territories under the control of terror groups in the Central Sahel show that the AES is not winning the war against Jihadist insurgents. Instead, the AES has created interstices exploited by NSAGs to converge, proliferate and expand across the Sahel. Two key reasons explain the failure of the AES: the exit of a more formidable regional organisation and governance failure. By exiting the ECOWAS at a time when regional security cooperation was most needed to combat Jihadist insurgency and terrorism, the AES deepened the fragmentation of regional organisations and foreclosed possibilities of regional security cooperation necessary for combating Jihadist insurgency and terrorism in the Sahel region. Secondly, by refusing to return their countries to a democratic system of government, the AES member states engender a legitimacy crisis and deepen governance deficits, which create conditions exploited by Jihadists to endear people to their ideologies. In 2025, the Assimi Goita-led Junta in Mali dissolved all political parties due to pressure from the political parties that the country be returned to democratic rule. In a similar move, in January 2026, the junta in Burkina Faso dissolved all political parties through a decree which scrapped the laws governing political parties in the country. The repression of political opposition, together with rights abuses by the military regimes in the AES member states, creates a tense political environment devoid of citizens’ trust in the government. Such a tense political environment, characterised by the absence of citizens’ trust in the government, creates fertile grounds for Jihadist insurgents to proliferate. With the recent weakening of the government in Mali and decimation of Russian mercenaries in Mali by an alliance of terror groups, it is likely that the Jihadist insurgents will expand rapidly to more strategic territories across the Central Sahel with little resistance from state forces. With the establishment of strongholds in more territories across the Central Sahel, the Jihadist insurgents will be better capacitated to launch more terrorist expeditions across the entire Sahel region.
Recommendations: Dealing with the threats of expanding terror in the Sahel region
- Strengthen Border Security: countries sharing territorial borders with AES countries should collectively and individually enhance security along their national borders. This will likely reduce the risk of Jihadist insurgents infiltrating AES neighbours where they are yet to have strongholds.
- Regional Organisations to Deepen Diplomatic Engagements with AES: Regional organisations like ECOWAS and the African Union should sustain diplomatic pressures on AES members to allow for the deployment of joint regional security forces to dislodge the Jihadist insurgents in the Central Sahel.
- Bilateral Engagements by Regional Hegemons: Regional hegemons in the Sahel region, like Nigeria and Chad, should also explore options of engaging member states of the AES to allow for bilateral security cooperation aimed at providing security support to combat the Jihadist insurgents in the AES member countries.
- Multilateral and Global Assistance: Aside from the proposed regional and sub-regional pressure and engagements, the central Sahel requires global efforts, considering the growing nature of terrorism and violent extremism. The AES from all analyses cannot do it alone, and paying a deaf ear to the situation may bring the entire Sahel region and beyond into more crisis.
- Strengthen Humanitarian Interventions in Local Communities across the AES: International organisations should support humanitarian aid agencies to access local communities in need of humanitarian assistance. This will serve as a soft strategy for winning the minds of local communities and reducing the tacit support that jihadist insurgents receive from local communities.
The April 2026 coordinated attacks in Mali by JNIM and FLA signal various disturbing trends about insecurity in the Sahel. First, the attacks signpost the broad security implications of the growing alliance between Jihadist terrorists and other local NSAGs across the Sahel. Secondly, it exposes the weaknesses of the AES and signposts how the absence of a strong regional security architecture arising from the fragmentation of regional organisations is being exploited by an alliance of terror groups to destabilise the Sahel region.
(Dr. Chukwuma Okoli is a visiting Lead, Research and Policy at Nextier and a Lecturer at the Political Science Department at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria; while Dr. Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner at Nextier and a Reader (Associate Professor) at the Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria)
