By Chibuike Njoku and Ndu Nwokolo
Nigeria’s recurring emergency preparedness failures raise a fundamental governance question: why does the country continue to experience substantial preventable losses despite existing emergency management institutions, early-warning systems and disaster-risk reduction policies? Flooding, climate-related hazards, disease outbreaks and conflict-induced displacement repeatedly place pressure on public institutions, disrupt livelihoods and increase humanitarian needs. The challenge is not the absence of preparedness initiatives, but whether state and non-state institutions consistently translate risk information and policy commitments into timely, coordinated and adequately resourced action.
For example, the scale of recurrent flooding illustrates one such failure. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) revealed that floods in 2024 displaced approximately 1.2 million people, destroyed about 116,000 homes and damaged 1.4 million hectares of farmland. These losses followed the devastating floods of 2022, which displaced approximately four million people.
Nigeria has established institutional and policy frameworks for disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Its National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025–2030), developed by the Office of the Vice President and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), identifies governance, risk knowledge, resilience investment, preparedness and early warning as strategic priorities. However, the existence of these frameworks does not, by itself, demonstrate that implementation is timely, coordinated or effective. The recent “scramble” over the detection of Ebola by a spouse of a foreign diplomat in the country depicts a lack of preparedness, even though the later actions were commendable.
This report argues that Nigeria’s preparedness challenge lies partly in weak institutional coordination and limited state capacity. Effective early action requires clear responsibilities, reliable information sharing, accessible contingency financing and institutions capable of implementing preventive measures. Drawing on Coordination and Effective State Theory, the brief examines the gap between early warning and early action and recommends reforms to strengthen accountability, operational readiness and anticipatory governance.
The Institutional and Theoretical Framework
Effective emergency preparedness depends not merely on early-warning information or the existence of emergency management institutions, but on the state’s ability to coordinate these institutions and translate warnings into timely preventive action. This brief applies Coordination Theory and Effective State Theory as complementary frameworks for examining Nigeria’s preparedness and early-action system.
Coordination and Institutional Alignment
Coordination Theory explains how institutions with different mandates, resources and responsibilities can work towards a shared objective. In emergency management, this requires vertical coordination across federal, state and local governments and horizontal coordination among agencies responsible for forecasting, health, infrastructure, environmental management, security and humanitarian assistance. Nigeria’s National Disaster Management Frameworkestablishes coordinating roles for the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) and local emergency management structures. The National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025–2030) also provides a policy framework for strengthening disaster risk governance, preparedness, and resilience. However, formal arrangements do not guarantee effective coordination. The critical test is whether institutions share information, clarify responsibilities, mobilise resources and implement decisions without avoidable delays or duplication.
Effective State Theory and Government Capacity
Effective State Theory examines the ability of public institutions to translate formal authority and policy commitments into measurable outcomes. This brief assesses state effectiveness through four dimensions: institutional alignment, administrative capacity, resource mobilisation and implementation capacity. Institutional alignment concerns the clarity of mandates, decision-making authority and accountability. Administrative capacity covers the personnel, expertise, information systems and operational structures needed to assess risks and coordinate responses. Resource mobilisation examines whether funding, equipment and logistics can be deployed before a crisis escalates. Implementation capacity assesses whether approved plans and decisions translate into preventive action at state, local government and community levels.
Integrating Coordination and State Capacity
The two perspectives establish a central proposition: coordination organises state capacity, while state capacity determines whether coordination delivers results. Accurate forecasts and formal policies cannot prevent avoidable losses when responsibilities are fragmented, financing is delayed, or local institutions lack operational capability. The brief therefore uses these perspectives to examine the gap between early warning and early action in Nigeria. It assesses whether institutional arrangements support timely decisions, whether resources are available when risks emerge and whether government agencies can implement preventive measures and account for their performance. This framework shifts the analysis beyond the existence of policies and institutions towards their demonstrated capacity to reduce foreseeable risks and protect lives.
From Early Warning to Early Action: Where the System Fails
The effectiveness of an emergency preparedness system depends on its ability to translate risk information into timely decisions, mobilise resources and implement preventive measures before hazards escalate. In Nigeria, the recurring impact of flooding illustrates why the availability of forecasts and official warnings alone is insufficient. The central policy challenge is the transition from identifying risks to acting on them. This requires institutions to share information, clarify responsibilities, release resources and deliver interventions at the scale and speed demanded by emerging threats.
Nigeria has taken steps towards strengthening this transition. In 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established an anticipatory action framework for flooding, with US$7 million in pre-arranged pooled funding for targeted interventions in vulnerable areas, subject to specified triggers and financing conditions. In June 2026, the Federal Government also directed the activation of NEMA’s Fusion and Trigger Room concept to strengthen the coordination of early action against flooding and other climate-related hazards. These initiatives demonstrate movement towards anticipatory approaches, but their wider institutionalisation and implementation remain important areas for assessment.
The first potential bottleneck is the conversion of warnings into decisions. Forecasting agencies may identify impending hazards, but effective action requires agreed thresholds, clear decision-making authority and predetermined responsibilities. Where these arrangements are unclear or fragmented, institutions may issue warnings without ensuring that the necessary protective measures are in place.
The second constraint concerns financing and resource mobilisation. Preparedness requires funding before emergencies reach their peak. Where contingency funds are unavailable, disbursements are delayed, or expenditure responsibilities are unclear, agencies may be unable to implement evacuation plans, pre-position supplies, or provide anticipatory assistance within the available window. Pre-arranged financing can help address this problem, but its effectiveness depends on transparent activation rules, accessible funds and the capacity to spend them promptly.
The third bottleneck is local implementation. National warnings must reach exposed communities in accessible formats and be accompanied by practical options for reducing risk. State and local authorities need functional emergency structures, trained personnel, transport, evacuation routes, shelters and community-level communication systems.
The fourth constraint is accountability for implementation. Preparedness arrangements are difficult to evaluate when institutions are not required to document who received warnings, what decisions followed, when funds were released and whether preventive measures were completed. Without clear performance indicators and post-event reviews, delays and institutional gaps may persist without corrective action.
Institutional Coordination and State Capacity
Nigeria’s ability to anticipate and mitigate emergencies depends on whether government institutions coordinate effectively, mobilise resources promptly and translate warnings into preventive action. Although the country has a disaster-management structure spanning federal, state and local governments, its effectiveness depends on whether these institutions function as an integrated system.
Federal–State–Local Government Relations
Emergency preparedness requires coordinated action across all three tiers of government. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) provides national coordination, State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) manage state-level arrangements, and local emergency management structures connect preparedness to communities. However, differences in funding, legal mandates, administrative capacity and operational readiness can weaken these relationships. National forecasts and preparedness directives must translate into state contingency plans and local interventions. While federal institutions provide technical support and coordination, state and local governments are essential to evacuation planning, community mobilisation, infrastructure protection and risk reduction.
Agency Mandates and Information Sharing
Preparedness also depends on coordination among agencies with complementary responsibilities. NEMA coordinates disaster management; the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) provides weather forecasts; and the Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency (NIHSA) supplies hydrological and flood-risk information. Other ministries and agencies oversee health, agriculture, water resources, infrastructure and environmental management. These functions must be integrated to turn hazard forecasts into practical interventions. Institutions must share reliable information about emerging hazards, exposed populations, vulnerable infrastructure and available resources through timely, compatible reporting systems. In the health sector, the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Welfare provides policy leadership; the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) leads disease surveillance, laboratory confirmation and outbreak response; Port Health Services screens travellers at points of entry; and the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) supports community-level services. These institutions must be linked to NEMA and the SEMAs through shared triggers and compatible reporting systems.
Financing and Operational Readiness
State capacity depends on the ability to mobilise resources before emergencies escalate. Preparedness requires predictable funding for risk assessments, warning dissemination, contingency planning, simulation exercises, equipment maintenance and early interventions. Where agencies rely on irregular allocations or lengthy emergency funding requests, they may lose critical opportunities to act. These constraints can be particularly acute at the subnational level, where limited budgets and competing priorities undermine implementation. Preparedness must therefore be measured by operational capability, not merely by the existence of plans. Trained personnel, functioning communications, transport, emergency equipment, evacuation routes, shelters, pre-positioned supplies and tested contingency arrangements are essential.
Community Capacity and Accountability
Communities are central to early action because they often identify emerging risks and experience their consequences first. Community organisations, traditional institutions, civil society groups and volunteers can support risk identification, warning dissemination and evacuation. However, warnings are useful only when people understand them, trust their sources and have practical means to act.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s preparedness gap reflects the disconnect between institutional responsibilities and implementation capacity. Clear mandates and shared information must be matched by timely financing, operational readiness and accountability. The decisive test is whether warnings trigger coordinated action that protects people before emergencies escalate.
Health Preparedness: Lessons from Ebola and Lassa Fever
Health emergencies test the chain from early warning to early action because the interval between detection and containment is measured in days. Nigeria’s health-security architecture is led by the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the NCDC, which is responsible for disease surveillance, laboratory diagnosis and outbreak response. They work with Port Health Services, the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), the NPHCDA, State Ministries of Health, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). Two recent episodes show the strengths and gaps of this system.
On 20 October 2026, the NCDC confirmed Nigeria’s first Ebola case in more than a decade, an imported Bundibugyo infection in Abuja for which there is no licensed vaccine. The response was swift: the national incident management system was activated, 53 primary contacts were placed under 21-day monitoring, and the patient was evacuated to Switzerland. Yet the case was confirmed about two weeks after symptom onset, and public communication was uneven, with conflicting early accounts of the patient’s identity and divergent statements on the ₦10 billion emergency fund approved in June 2026.
Lassa fever is a more predictable hazard, yet by epidemiological week 40 of 2026 the NCDC had recorded 1,138 confirmed cases and 268 deaths, a fatality rate of 23.6 per cent compared with 18.6 per cent in 2025. The NCDC attributes this partly to late presentation, high treatment costs and poor health-seeking behaviour. Known hotspots and seasonality have not translated into earlier care.
Together, the two cases show that Nigeria can mobilise quickly once a threat is confirmed, but that detection, risk communication, transparent financing and coordination between health agencies, NEMA and the SEMAs remain weak links. Health preparedness should therefore be integral to anticipatory governance rather than a parallel track.
Policy Recommendations: Building an Anticipatory State
Nigeria’s transition from reactive emergency response to anticipatory governance requires reforms that connect risk information to decisions, financing and implementation. The priority is not to create additional institutions indiscriminately, but to strengthen existing arrangements so that warnings trigger timely, coordinated and accountable action. The following recommendations address the institutional and operational gaps identified in this brief. The recommendations also address health preparedness, drawing on the Ebola and Lassa fever experience.
i. Institutionalise Operational Early-Action Protocols: The Federal Government should establish a standard early-action protocol under NEMA and the NCDC for health emergencies that links verified risk thresholds to predetermined interventions. The protocol should specify the lead agency, supporting institutions, decision-making authority, implementation deadlines and escalation procedures for each priority hazard, including epidemic threats such as Ebola and Lassa fever.
ii. Strengthen Intergovernmental Coordination: NEMA should work with state governments, SEMAs, State Ministries of Health, local governments and relevant technical agencies, such as the NCDC and Port Health Services to establish a standing operational coordination mechanism. This should include shared risk assessments, interoperable information systems (including disease surveillance data), designated institutional focal points and joint preparedness exercises.
iii. Establish Predictable, Pre-arranged Financing: The Federal Government and state governments should establish transparent contingency-financing arrangements that make resources available when agreed early-action triggers are reached. Budgetary provisions should cover preparedness planning, risk communication, evacuation, emergency logistics, outbreak response, laboratory capacity and anticipatory assistance. Emergency health funds, including the ₦10 billion intervention fund, should have clear activation rules and be publicly reported.
iv. Strengthen Subnational and Community-Level Capacity: State and local governments should receive targeted technical and financial support to strengthen emergency management institutions and public health systems. Priority investments should include trained personnel (including frontline health workers), functional communication systems, updated risk maps, evacuation plans, emergency equipment, personal protective equipment, isolation capacity, accessible shelters, and regularly tested contingency arrangements.
v. Introduce Performance Accountability and Institutional Learning: NEMA, in collaboration with the NCDC, relevant oversight institutions and state governments, should establish a national preparedness performance framework. The framework should assess whether warnings trigger action, whether funds are released on time, whether local institutions are operationally ready and whether preventive interventions reach intended communities. For health emergencies, it should also track the time from symptom onset to confirmation and the completion of contact follow-up.
Conclusion
Nigeria’s recurring emergencies preparedness failures expose the limitations of a predominantly reactive emergency management system. While emergency response remains indispensable, preventable losses persist when foreseeable risks fail to prompt timely action. The priority is therefore to translate early warnings, institutional mandates and available resources into coordinated interventions that protect lives and livelihoods. As this brief demonstrates, effective preparedness depends on the interaction between institutional coordination and state capacity. Federal, state and local governments must clarify responsibilities, share reliable information, mobilise resources promptly and maintain the operational capacity to act. Accountability must also establish whether warnings prompted action, funding reached implementing institutions, and interventions achieved measurable results. The imported Ebola case and the persistently high Lassa fever fatality rate show that this applies equally to health emergencies, where earlier detection, transparent financing and stronger coordination between the NCDC, health authorities at all levels and emergency management agencies can determine whether a threat is contained or becomes a crisis.
(Dr Chibuike Njoku is an Associate Consultant at Nextier, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Ile-Ife, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA-Nigeria). Dr Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner at Nextier and a reader (Associate Professor) at the Institute for Peace, Security and Development Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. He is also a Senior Scholar at the Centre for Intelligence, Security and Peace Studies, Coal City University Enugu, Nigeria)
